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 Abstract 
 
 
This paper approaches health care criteria by maximizing society’s consumption 
possibilities in a model where health is a special case of a good produced, 
consumed, and used as an input in production, and the patient chooses from 
alternative therapies. It complements the conventional approach, in providing 
conditions under which it is optimal to provide care beyond the public health 
standard. It is shown to be optimal to provide health care beyond the previously 
obtained optimum where the marginal product generated by the care equals its 
marginal social cost, up to the point where the sum of the marginal product and 
the marginal utility equals that cost - but only if the patient is willing to pay the full 
marginal social cost of the part that exceeds the marginal product, out of his 
after-tax income, the part corresponding to the marginal product being deductible 
from taxable income. For the decision, the social planner needs to know the 
costs of different therapies and the times they take to bring the patient to working 
condition, as well as the patient' s labor income in this condition, but not the 
patient’s preferences. The higher the patient' s labor income, the more it is 
optimal to spend on more efficient therapy, and provide a “tax subsidy” by 
keeping the expenses for the investment part tax-deductible. An increase in 
hospital capacity leads to treating patients with cases medically minor to those 
treated before, incomes equal, if rationing is done optimally so that this finding is 
not necessarily a sign of demand-shifting. 
 
 
Keywords: optimal medical care, incentives for optimal care 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modern medicine has greatly improved our ability to keep people alive, although 
often at an increasing cost. Thus it is now society’s resource constraint that has 
emerged as a key reason why it is no longer possible to sustain every person' s 
life by "all possible means". The new situation calls for new thinking on the 
decision criteria of health care.1 
  
In the future, and in many countries today, we seem to be faced with a dual 
system. A certain amount of care is provided by the public health system. The 
patient may wish to purchase more, and society has an interest in ensuring that 
he has an incentive to purchase neither too little nor too much of it. Determining 
the optimal amount of this care and the policy to achieve it is the purpose of this 
paper, given the care provided by the public health system. 
 
Our approach is based on the following notions. Medical decisions are special 
cases of resource allocation decisions on three often partly overlapping goods. If 
the "health" so produced is regarded as a publicly provided or financed free 
good, we are dealing with a "public health good". To the extent that it makes the 
patient more productive (e.g. fit for the labor force), we are dealing with an 
investment good, which will increase society's total output, and thus its 
consumption possibilities of both health and other goods (see Grossman 
(l972a,b)). To the extent that it makes the patient feel better it is a consumption 
good.  
 
The above distinction is as important on a conceptual level as it is in most other 
fields, because the evaluation criteria of any expenditures should be determined 
by whether the expenditure is regarded as investment or consumption, and 
whether it is public or private. Moreover, since the opportunity cost of any 
resources on health is forgone consumption of mainly other goods, the issue of 
resource allocation should be addressed not only in the context of the health 
care sector, but also between health on the one hand, and other goods, on the 
other. 
 
In the above classification, much of the literature on the subject deals with care 
that can be regarded as being related to the public health good. The minimum 
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health standards secured by the public health system (or by full insurance 
coverage) are generally goods with a practically zero user cost, provided or 
financed publicly (or by the insurance company) irrespective of the ability to pay 
or of the marginal product generated by that health. The care to produce them is 
to correct for various market failures, i.e. to take care of "equity", "value of life", 
merit good, and externality considerations, and its extent and coverage is 
determined as a political decision. The issues associated with this “public health 
standard” are not addressed here. However, it is often consistent with the 
efficiency of resource allocation to provide care beyond this standard, and the 
focus of this paper is examining the optimal criteria for that care. 
 
Our survey of earlier writings is brief, as this author is not aware of writings taking 
a similar “partial general equilibrium” approach, with health in its three roles. 
Arrow (1963) lays the foundations for the study of the market for medical care in 
general. Smallwood and Smith (1976) take an optimizing approach, analyzing 
the dichotomy of the life and death of the patient. They minimize the expected 
patient loss of the patient population, subject to a capacity constraint. Pauly 
(1979) suggests that the expected value of income or of the therapeutic gain of 
care be used as the criterion of care. There is an extensive literature where the 
criterion for care decisions is the number of quality-adjusted life years produced 
by that care for the patient, each patient counting equally. This QALY approach 
has been used as a criterion for the public health good. 
  
The purpose of this paper is to devise an optimal tax and subsidy treatment  of 
health care expenditures, as well as rationing criteria, for care in excess of the 
level provided by the public health system. Like a committee on such a reform, 
we will focus on the task on hand and take the care provided by the public health 
system, and the general tax and subsidy system as given. We will build a social 
welfare-maximizing model with standard assumptions regarding the behavior 
functions, where health is a consumption good and an investment good, 
produced in the economy. The problem consists of two parts. First, the social 
planner determines the socially optimal amount of health in individual cases. 
Secondly, he sets the tax and subsidy statuses of health care expenditures so as 
to induce the patient to choose the optimal amount -- without knowing the 
individual utility functions. The criteria derived are intended to provide a basis for 
more practical guidelines. The guidelines, together with the theory of physician 
  
3 
behavior, make it possible at least in principle to determine an incentive system 
to contribute to an efficient allocation of resources. 
It will be shown that it is optimal to provide health care beyond the conventional 
optimum point where the marginal product generated by the care - the product of 
the marginal gain in the patient’s productivity and his income in his normal state 
of health - equals its marginal social cost, up to the point where the sum of the 
marginal product and the marginal utility equals the marginal social cost. 
 
How the patient can be induced to choose the optimum amount depends on the 
user cost of care and whether the patient has sick leave with pay. If the user cost 
equals the marginal social cost and the patient gets no sick pay, it is always 
optimal to provide care up to the point where its marginal social cost equals its 
marginal social product, and it is optimal for the patient to choose this amount if 
its cost is deductible from taxable income. Besides, it is optimal to provide more 
if the patient is willing to pay the difference between the marginal social cost and 
the marginal social product of the increment out of his after-tax income, while the 
part corresponding to the marginal product is deductible. However, if the patient 
has fully paid, rather than unpaid sick leave, the former, or the investment care 
should be free for the patient to choose the optimal amount. 
 
If the user cost of care is kept below its marginal social cost, the optimal care is 
the same, but rationing is necessary for an optimal amount of care to be chosen. 
In rationing, it is optimal to rank the patients according to their marginal products 
from care, and give each patient treatment down to the point where the marginal 
product equals the marginal social cost of care – or its shadow price. However, if 
the patient requests more care and is willing to pay the part of the marginal 
social cost exceeding the marginal product out of his after-tax income, the part 
corresponding to the marginal product being deductible, it is optimal to provide 
him with that care. Likewise, it is optimal to admit a patient rationed on the above 
criterion if he is willing to pay enough to get above the line in the above manner. 
Of course, these results are independent of who actually delivers the care, a 
government or a private organization.2 
 
To apply this approach on an crude level, the physician needs to know only the 
patient' s labor income in his normal state of health, the costs of alternative kinds 
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of care, and the times he expects them to take to bring the patient to working 
condition, but not the patients’ utility functions. 
The above has several implications. The higher the patient' s labor income, and 
the greater the expected marginal therapeutic gains from care, the more it is 
optimal to spend on more efficient (and safer) therapy. It is also optimal to give a 
greater "tax subsidy" to high labor income earners by making investment health 
expenses, but not private consumption health expenses deductible from taxable 
income - contrary to conventional wisdom. The greater the marginal social rate of 
time preference and the more remote the patient' s entry into the labor force, the 
less it is optimal to spend on the patient' s care. Care to hopeless cases is not 
justified by investment criteria, which makes it consumption. The same applies to 
health insurance premia with different coverages: Costly first class care may be 
optimal and its investment part should be tax-deductible for high labor income 
earners, but not necessarily for others. 
 
If rationing is done optimally, an increase in hospital capacity leads to treating 
patients with cases minor to those treated before, adjusted for incomes, and it is 
not necessarily a sign of demand-shifting. These and other findings suggest that 
much of the evidence presented in support of the supplier-induced demand (SID) 
doctrine is also consistent with socially optimal physician behavior. 
 
In our model with a homogenous labor force, sick pay, payroll taxes, and 
substitutes’ higher cost can provide the patient’s employer with an incentive to 
pay part of the bill, which may lead to the patient getting more care than the 
social optimum. 
 
While many may regard the above criteria as "unethical", we find it important to 
know what efficiency of resource allocation calls for beyond the public health 
standard so that the real resource cost of using other criteria could be 
determined. Namely, it is always optimal to provide this amount of care 
irrespective of the other objectives of health care policy, since it brings society to 
its production possibility frontier and maximizes the consumption possibilities of 
society' s members. 
 
Of course, meeting first-best conditions (even if in a bounded rationality sense) in 
a subsector of the economy is no guarantee of a superior equilibrium in the 
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whole economy of a second-best world. However, economies are reformed in a 
piecemeal way subject to a variety of constraints, and this paper attempts to 
provide conditions for the reform of one subsector. A superior solution is 
guaranteed if all the sectors in the economy achieve a first-best solution. It is the 
task of other papers to provide optimal solutions regarding the variables that we 
take as given. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. A model to determine socially optimal decision 
criteria is constructed and studied in Part 2. We will first determine the optimum, 
and thereafter see how the policy-maker can induce individuals to purchase the 
optimal amounts, by means of taxes and subsidies. This is followed by an 
illustration with a numerical example. Subsequently, we will derive the 
propositions enumerated above. Part 3 is the conclusion. The employer’s 
incentives to pay part of the sick bill and cause a deviation from the social 
optimum are part of the puzzle, and their interplay with the patient’s incentives is 
studied in the Appendix.  
 
2. Optimal Criteria for Medical Decisions 
 
a. The Optimum 
 
The social planner' s objective is to maximize the welfare of society by 
determining the amount of (possibly subsidized) health care given to society' s 
members beyond the public health standard, and thereafter determining the tax 
and subsidy status of different kinds of care to induce individuals to purchase the 
optimum amount. For the purposes of this problem, society' s welfare is the sum 
of the utilities of its members, any considerations of equity, need, and 
externalities being taken care of by exogenous taxes and transfers and by the 
public health good. Each individual maximizes his utility subject to his budget 
constraint, given the prices he faces. The individuals' utilities are a function of 
their health and of other goods, where the former reflects the consumption good 
aspect of health. The planner does not know the individual utility functions. The 
individuals' health consists of their initial states of health plus the exogenous free 
public health good, and of the individually purchased health. In addition to being 
a consumption good, health is also an input in production, improving the 
individuals' productivity. Since individuals are paid their marginal products, their 
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disposable income, used for the purchase of health and other goods, is a 
function of their actual state of health. 
 
Production of both goods takes place on competitive markets, with labor as the 
variable input. 
 
Examine the following model, with the consumer and producer sectors, and two 
goods, health (X) and other goods (V). We have: 
 
                     k 
 UT =  Σ  U (X0i + XPi + XIi, Vi )      (1) 
                    i=1  i 
 
 YDi = (1-t) Yi = PXcXIi + Vi      (2) 
 
                     - 
 Yi = ziYi         (3) 
 
 
 
 
 zi = zi(X0i + XPi + XIi)       (4) 
 
Equation (1) is the social welfare function, where welfare is the sum of the 
utilities of society' s k members (See e.g. Ng (1975)). However, the policy-maker 
does not know the individuals' utility functions. Each individual maximizes his 
own utility, which is a function of his state of health ( )IPi XXX ++0  and of other 
goods (V). The initial state of health X0 reflects possible depreciation and losses 
caused by illness during the period, and XPi is the health provided by the public 
health system, henceforth called the "public health good". The X0 + XP can be 
augmented by individually purchased health ( )IX . The utility functions have 
positive first and negative second derivatives with respect to their arguments, 
assumed to be normal goods.  
 
In Eq. (2), the individual' s disposable income (YDi) is one minus the net tax 
( )0>t  or income transfer ( )0<t  rate, times his labor income Yi. (Income should 
in this context be interpreted as including services not traded on the market, e.g. 
those of a housewife).3 The YDi is spent on the two goods, with PXc the relative 
user price of X to the individual in terms of other goods V, the numeraire. To 
keep the expressions simple, we will set the user cost of public health to zero, 
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since it is beyond the scope of this paper. Since we are interested in decision 
criteria for individual situations, we do not need to treat the public sector budget 
constraint explicitly, but taxes are collected to finance PX , income transfers, and 
other government expenditures outside this model. This enables us to treat the 
tax rate as a parameter. 
In Equation (3), the worker' s labor income equals his marginal product and is his 
productivity rate (zi) times his income in his normal state of health ( )iY . Naturally, 
the utilities and incomes should be understood as the present values of the 
respective flows. An operational counterpart for z could be e.g. the number of 
hours worked. The Y  would be the wage rate. 
 
In Equation (4), zi is a function of the individual’s state of health, consisting of 
X0i, XPi, and IiX . Naturally, it also reflects any effects that the worker’s health 
may have on his level of effort and his labor-leisure decisions. This “production 
function” has a positive first and negative second derivative with respect to 
health.4 
 
The production sector consists of two industries, one for each good. Both have 
standard production functions (Equations (5) and (6)), with positive first and 
negative second derivatives with respect to effective labor (zL), the variable 
input, where z is the average productivity rate of labor and Lq the amount of 
labor employed in industry q (q = X,V). 
 
 X = fX(zLX)         (5) 
 V = fV(zLV)         (6) 
 
       -  
 piX = PXX – zLXY        (7) 
 
                                - 
 piV = V – zLVY        (8) 
 
                  m 
 X =  Σ (XPi + XIi)        (9) 
                 i=1 
 L = LX + LV                 (10) 
 
Equations (7) and (8) are the profit functions of the two industries, where profit 
( )pi  is the difference between sales revenue and labor costs, with PX the relative 
price of health and Y  the average income of labor in its normal state of health. 
We will refrain from complicating the model by means of explicitly introducing 
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indirect taxes, since their effects are obvious from the expressions below. Eq. (9) 
is the market equation of health, stating that its total production is the sum of the 
XPi and IiX . Eq. (10) is the labor market equation, stating that the exogenous 
labor force (L) equals the sum of LX and LV. 
 
It is worth noting that our production function of health (5) nests that of health, 
with health care as the input, and that of health care, with labor as the input. We 
have: ( )( )LHHXLX ∂∂∂∂=∂∂ /// , where H is health care, and qualitative 
statements regarding health also apply to care. Thus: HXPP XH ∂∂= // . 
 
Maximizing profits with respect to (LX) and (LV) subject to the production 
functions and market equations on competitive markets yields the producer 
optimum: 
 
 ( ) ( ) XPLXLV =∂∂∂∂ ///                (11) 
 
The producer optimum is standard: the relative producer price of X reflects its 
marginal social cost of production relative to that of V.  
 
The policy-maker is concerned with the marginal social product and the marginal 
social cost of health ( ( )YXz I∂∂ / , and PX, respectively), rather than their private 
counterparts in Eq. (2). We obtain the social optimum by maximizing UT with 
respect to the IiX and Vi subject to (2) through (4), setting PXc = PX and t = 0:5 
 
                                                     
 ( ) ( ) ( ) iiIiiIX YXzVUXUP ∂∂+∂∂∂∂= ////              (12) 
 
The concavity assumptions of the utility and production functions ensure that the 
second-order conditions for maximum are satisfied. 
 
Equation (12) reflects the fact that health is a joint input: it increases productivity 
and thereby income (Eqs. 3 and 4) in addition to generating utility directly. Hence 
only the difference between the marginal social cost PX and the marginal social 
product generated ( )[ ]iiI YXz ∂∂ /  is the cost attributable to private consumption. 
Thus it is normally optimal to induce the individuals to acquire private health past 
the point where its marginal utility equals its marginal social cost, and conversely, 
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past the point where its marginal social product equals its marginal social cost. 
We have: 
 
Proposition 1. In the social optimum, the marginal social cost of health equals 
the sum of the marginal social product and the marginal utility of health. 
 
The policy-maker’s optimization is illustrated in Figure 1. There, the lower 
declining curve depicts the marginal social product of the pure investment aspect 
of IX  for the patient, given X0+ XP. The higher curve depicts the sum of this 
marginal product and the marginal utility of the private consumption aspect of IX  
relative to ∂U/∂V (Eq. (12)), reflecting diminishing returns and diminishing 
marginal utility, respectively, of health. The horizontal curve is the marginal social 
cost of health PX, constant in an individual patient’s case, so that the total cost of 
IX  is the area under this curve. 
 
   [Figure 1 about here] 
 
The conventional optimal amount of health is 1IX , where the marginal social cost 
and the marginal social product of health are equal (see e.g. Pauly (1979)). 
However, it leaves the net consumer surplus of ABC unutilized so that it cannot 
be the social optimum in a model where health generates utility. This optimum is 
2IX , where the sum of the marginal product and marginal utility equals the 
marginal social cost.  
 
Examining the Figure in greater detail, the social cost of health is fully covered by 
its investment aspect up to 1IX . The area 21 II ACXX  represents the marginal 
social cost of the extra health ( )12 II XX − . It would generate extra output by 
21 II ADXX  and extra utility by ABCD. The shaded triangle ACD is the part of the 
marginal social cost of the extra health that is not covered by the increase in 
output that it made possible. This is the private consumption health part of the 
marginal cost of the increment. 
 
It is easy to see that past 2IX , the social marginal cost of health exceeds the 
sum of its marginal utility and marginal product. Thus if health were a free good 
and there were no rationing, the patient would choose 3IX , where the sum of the 
marginal utility and marginal product is zero. This would result in a loss 
  
10 
represented by the area between the PX curve and the 3ICX  curve between 2IX  
and 3IX  (not shown).6 
 
b. The Policy 
 
What should the social planner do to induce the patient to choose 2IX , given 
that the patient faces the private costs and prices, as specified in Eq. (2)? The 
patient’s optimum condition is: 
 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) iiIiiIcX YXztVUXUP ∂∂−+∂∂∂∂= /1///            (13) 
 
 
This differs from the social optimum in two respects, given that we took care of 
externalities with PX .5 The market price of health may deviate from its marginal 
social cost by the taxes or subsidies on health services. (We have not modeled 
indirect taxes or subsidies explicitly for simplicity, as their effects are obvious.) 
Secondly, income taxes drive a wedge between the marginal social product of 
health and the marginal disposable income it generates for the individual. The 
social planner should now optimally determine the tax and subsidy statuses of 
the two kinds of health. 
 
To determine optimal pricing, we obtain from Eqs. (12) and (13): 
 
 
  
 ( ) ,/ YXztPP IcXX ∂∂=−               (14) 
 
 
where PX - PXc is the optimal subsidy per unit given to health. 
 
This yields the following rules for the determination of the optimal pricing or tax 
status of health. For the private consumption part of health, or the area between 
the declining curves, ( )0/ =∂∂ IXz  holds, which makes the right hand side of Eq. 
(14) zero. Therefore, 
 
Proposition 2. It is optimal to charge the private consumption health its full 
marginal social cost (P
  X = P  Xc), impose on it the same consumption taxes as 
those on other goods, and keep its expenses non-deductible from taxable 
income, since otherwise pricing would cause the ratio of the marginal utilities of 
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the two pure consumption goods to be different from their relative marginal social 
cost of production (Eqs. (11) and (12)).7 
 
Proposition 3. It is optimal to subsidize the investment part of health 
( 0/ =∂∂ IXU  in Eqs. (12) and (13)) by the tax on the marginal income generated 
by this extra health. Alternatively, the expenses for this part, but not those for the 
private consumption part, could be made deductible from taxable income, while 
pricing it at its marginal social cost. The latter alternative is more practical, since 
marginal income tax rates are typically different across individuals. It would 
produce the equivalent of t = 0 in Eq. (14) making it: PX - PXc = 0. The 
investment part would now be “self-financing”. If e.g. the subsidy were smaller, 
the marginal user cost of health would be higher, which would lead the individual 
to purchase less investment health than would be optimal in Eq. (12). Note, 
however, that this optimality holds if the patient is literally paid his marginal 
product and thus gets no pay when out of work. We will shortly return to the case 
of sick pay. 
 
In terms of the Figure, the social planner should offer the patient 2IX  so that the 
cost of 1IX  is fully deductible, since it is fully covered by the investment health 
part. In addition, the part 21 II ADXX , of the cost of 12 II XX −  should be 
deductible. The remaining part of the cost ACD is not covered by additional 
output, and it should be non-deductible and subject to general consumption 
taxes as private consumption. Now, the rational patient would choose 2IX , 
ending up with the net consumer surplus of ABC for 12 II XX − . This is of course 
independent of whether the health is produced by the government or by the 
private sector. 
 
In other words, it is optimal to provide 2IX  only if the patient pays the full 
marginal social cost of the increase in private consumption health of 12 II XX − , - 
but only this - out of his after-tax income in the same way as that of other private 
consumption goods, in addition to the deductible cost of the investment health 
1IX XP  plus 21 II ADXX . 
 
Alternatively, the social planner could make an all-or-nothing offer of 2IX  
outright, when the price should be lower than the area under the higher declining 
curve down to 2IX , adjusted for the fact that the area under the lower declining 
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curve should be deductible from taxable income. The trouble with this alternative 
is that not only is it arbitrary, but the social planner does not know the patient' s 
utility function and therefore cannot determine 2IX . The social planner can even 
have the doctor -- his agent -- offer the patient several alternatives with assessed 
effects and costs, as will be demonstrated below. As will be shown, if the above 
optimal pricing and tax statuses are used, the social planner needs to know only 
the marginal costs and the marginal products, or PX, IXz ∂∂ / , and Y , but not the 
patient’s preferences. 
 
In reality, there are often institutional arrangements making both the user cost of 
care and/or the marginal gain in disposable income zero or considerably smaller 
than PX or ( )YXz I∂∂ / , respectively. While affecting the private variables, they do 
not affect their social counterparts and the social optimum, unless they call for 
more care than that optimum. A key redistributive policy instrument in this model 
is the public health good XP along with taxes and subsidies. If the public health 
good XP is provided free of charge to everyone, the above principles apply to 
health in excess of X0 + XP, as stated above. For instance, let XP increase to 
1IX . The patient would now choose 2IX  if offered a deductible 21 II ADXX  and a 
non-deductible ACD. In the public health good, the patient would thus receive an 
additional net income transfer - or social insurance benefit - of ( ) PX XPt ∆−1  (Eq. 
(14)). Obviously the same applies to any health with a zero user cost e.g. due to 
health insurance. 
 
It is of course possible that XP exceeds 2IX . Then the motivations behind the 
provision of public health or health insurance call for more health than would be 
justified by its marginal product and private marginal utility, the efficiency criteria 
of this model. An example is Medicare. In either case, it is always optimal to 
provide at least 2IX  irrespective of the other objectives of health care policy, 
since this amount maximizes the welfare of society. 
 
The case with a user cost at a fraction of PX is a straightforward extension of the 
above analysis, in lowering PXc without affecting the PX and the other curves. 
Then rationing is necessary if the policy-maker wants the patient to choose the 
amount 2IX  of health.8 We will later return to this issue. 
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Secondly, if the patient has a fully paid sick leave, his marginal disposable 
income from care would be zero. Then also the user cost of investment health 
would have to be zero, because he would now optimize by equating 
( ) ( )VUXUP IcX ∂∂∂∂= /// , in Eq. (13). The patient would then choose 2IX  if 
offered the care exceeding 1IX  for a non-deductible ACD. Alternatively, he could 
be made an all-or-nothing offer: the therapy or the sick pay could be made 
conditional on his choosing the optimum prescribed amount, when he could be 
charged a non-deductible amount slightly smaller than the area between the 
declining curves from the point X0 + XP down to 2IX . However, this would 
require knowledge of his utility function. Currently, one sees a variety of systems 
in health insurance. Obviously, physicians currently use completely different 
criteria in determining therapy and the length of the sick leave. 
 
In determining optimal therapy, the physician needs to proceed in the same 
basic way as currently. He already needs to assess for the patient the expected 
costs of alternative kinds of care ( )cXIXI PXPX or  and their clinical effectiveness 
(dz), given the symptoms, on the basis of which IXz ∂∂ /  can be calculated. In 
fact, the patient performs this calculation at least implicitly in deciding whether he 
wants to spend more for a more effective or more pleasant treatment. The 
problem is made easier by the fact that there are often relatively few conceivable 
therapies, which makes the z-function discontinuous in many places. The 
physician can ask the patient about Y , and in many countries the patient’s 
answer can be verified from public sources. But since the private consumption 
part is determined residually, no knowledge of the utility function is needed. Yet 
the practical difficulties with these assessments should not be underestimated.9 
Of course, our objective function is different from that currently used, if any. 
 
c. A Numerical Example 
 
First assume that the user cost of care equals its marginal social cost (PXc = PX) 
and the patient gets no pay on sick leave. Suppose the patient earns $10 000 a 
month and the social discount rate is 12 % per annum, or 1 % per month. Let the 
risks associated with different therapies be equal for simplicity. Without therapy, 
the patient gets to working condition (z ≈ 1) in six months. The first therapy gets 
the patient to working condition in four months. The present values of the 
patient' s marginal products in his normal state of health in the fifth and sixth 
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months are roughly $9 500, and $9 400, respectively. Thus the marginal product 
of the therapy over no care ( )( )YXz I∂∂ /  is the present value of his income for the 
fifth and sixth months, or $18 900. A therapy whose marginal social cost equals 
this amount on a present value basis brings the patient to point A at 1IX  in the 
Figure, and its cost is the fully deductible charge. 
 
If another therapy healing the patient in four months costs $25 000, it is optimal 
to provide it if the patient pays the extra, or an additional $6 100 out of his after-
tax income to get to a point between A and B in the Figure: if he is indifferent at 
the margin, he is at B. The marginal product remains unchanged so that the 
difference is private consumption. 
 
A third therapy restores the patient to working condition in three months. Its 
marginal product over the second therapy is the present value of the patient’s 
marginal product for the fourth month, or $9 600. (If this brings the patient to the 
optimum, it equals 21 II ADXX  in the Figure.) If the therapy costs $35 000, its 
marginal cost is $10 000 over the second therapy so that the difference of $400 
is the increase in private consumption health (roughly ACD). This brings the total 
non-deductible charge to $6 500 (= $6 100 + $400) which is to be paid in 
addition to the deductible charge of $28 500 (= $18 900 + $9 600). The patient is 
now between points D and C; if he is indifferent at the margin, he is at C. On a 
crude level, it is a choice of these sums that the doctor or the social administrator 
should offer the patient along with a description of the therapies. 
 
The optimal amounts of care remain the same if the user cost of the therapies is 
smaller than their marginal social costs. The doctor can compute the investment 
part of health based on the marginal social cost as before. However, if also 
private consumption health is subsidized , the patient has an incentive to 
purchase more of it than would be optimal, as seen from Eqs. (12) and (13). 
Therefore the doctor should be careful not to offer him alternatives that could be 
regarded as being beyond 2IX  by some commonly accepted standard. An 
obvious solution to the problem would be to make the user cost of private 
consumption health equal to its marginal social cost. 
 
If the free public health good XP (or care fully covered by insurance) is the care 
costing $18 900 it would of course be provided free of charge. It would be 
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optimal to provide the $25 000 care for a non-deductible $6 100, and the $35 
000 care for a non-deductible $6 500 plus a deductible $9 600. 
 
If the patient has a sick leave with full pay, he should be offered the investment 
health for free: the $18 900 care for free, the $25 000 care for a non-deductible 
$6 100 and the $35 000 care for a non-deductible $6 500. 
 
Correspondingly, for an otherwise identical patient with an income of $5 000 a 
month, the value of the marginal product of the 4-month care over no care is $9 
450. So it is optimal to provide the $18 900 therapy for the deductible amount of 
$9 450, the remaining $9 450 being non-deductible. The deductible charge for 
the $25 000 care would be the same, $15 550 (= $9 450 + $6 100) being non-
deductible. As seen, if private consumption health is priced at its marginal social 
cost, the doctor needs to know only YXz I ,/ ∂∂  and PX, but not the patient' s 
utility function, and he can differentiate the prices and tax status optimally 
without explicitly having to bother about consumption and investment health. 
That is, investment health is assessed indirectly by its marginal product. 
 
Again, if the $18 900 care is the free public health good, it is provided free of 
charge. The $25 000 care would be provided for a non-deductible $6 100. The 
same amounts apply if the patient has sick leave with full pay. 
 
The number of possible cases seems to be large at first sight. However, many of 
them pertain to a regime which rules out other regimes. The number declines 
considerably if all the patients are under a common regime: if the public health 
good or health insurance coverage, and the sick pay arrangements, are the 
same for all citizens. 
 
d. Implications 
 
Equation (12) implies: 
 
 
            ∂z  _     ∂U ∂U       ∂z  _     ∂U ∂U 
 () Y + (/)  = () Y + (/) = P.           (15) 
           ∂X i  i    ∂X ∂V i     ∂X  j j     ∂X ∂V j    X 
     I          I              I           I 
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Thus, abstracting from the private consumption health part for the time being, the 
optimal marginal gains from health in the patients' marginal products are equal 
across patients, and equal the marginal social cost of health. The same holds of 
course also for different kinds of treatment (e.g. drugs and hospital care if their 
effects are independent) for any patient.  
 
Proposition 4. It is optimal to give a patient with a high expected marginal 
therapeutic gain from care ( )( )[ ]HXXz II ∂∂∂∂ //  more care than to a patient 
whose marginal gain is lower for equal incomes. Likewise, the higher the 
patient' s labor income in his normal state of health, the more it is optimal to 
spend on more efficient (and/or safer) therapy, given the expected marginal 
therapeutic gains from different kinds of care. This can be read off Equation (15), 
given diminishing returns on health and health care (Eq. (4) and p. 7, 
respectively). Spending more resources to get a high labor income earner back 
to the labor force more quickly (and/or more safely) relinquishes more resources 
for society than it uses up, except at the margin.10 In addition, if the patient is 
willing to pay the full marginal social cost of the private consumption part of any 
additional care out of his after-tax income, and that of the investment part out of 
his before-tax income, it is optimal to provide it for the same reason. 
 
The result on the optimal amount of care is at variance with the critique of the 
"tax subsidy" to high labor income earners. (See e.g. Feldstein (1981) Enthoven 
(1984) and others.) A greater tax subsidy given to high labor income earners in 
terms of the deductibility of health expenses is consistent with efficiency as long 
as the expenses are for pure investment health, since if labor income is taxed, 
expenditures to bring this income to normal should be deductible for taxes to be 
neutral. The potential output so generated is greater than the resources used up 
by such care, except at the margin. However, unlimited deductibility amounts to 
a subsidy to private consumption health, whose demand is also a function of 
income (see Eqs. (1), (2), and (13)) and the critique is justified on this part. 
 
Proposition 5. In rationing, it is optimal to rank the patients according to their 
marginal products from care, and give each patient treatment down to the point 
where the marginal product equals the marginal social cost of care. Requests for 
additional treatment are to be treated as suggested regarding 12 II XX − . This 
can also be read off Equation (15). Thus it is optimal to admit a patient who was 
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rationed on the above criterion if he is willing to pay large enough a sum to get 
"above the line". By buying himself a hospital bed he trades other goods for 
rationed health with the rest of society, relinquishing more resources for society 
to consume than the net gain in the marginal product of the marginal patient 
rationed in his place. If the marginal product of a certain rationed care to a given 
patient is $18 900, while the corresponding marginal product of the marginal 
patient is $24 000, it is optimal to admit the patient in place of the marginal 
patient if he is willing to pay a non-deductible $5 101 in addition to the deductible 
user cost of the $18 900 care, which will bring the total marginal gain to $24 001. 
 
The above result is at variance with Smallwood and Smith (1976), who 
recommend the ranking of patients according to the severity of symptoms, i.e. 
the initial losses of health rather than the potential marginal products of care. 
That would lead to a ranking radically different from ours in e.g. putting hopeless 
cases at the head of the line. In our model, care to hopeless cases has a zero 
marginal product and is not justified by investment criteria but is consumption.11 
 
As proposed, there is always rationing in optimum when health care is priced 
below its marginal social cost, since it is not optimal to provide the market-
clearing amount of care at this price. However, if capacity were to fall even below 
its optimal level, the shadow price of health would be 2λ+XP , where 2λ  is the 
Lagrangian of the capacity constraint, as the reader can verify. We have: 
 
Corollary 1. A partial relaxation of the capacity constraint (increase in hospital 
capacity) leads to treating patients with marginal products from care lower than 
before if the ranking is done optimally, adjusted for the patients' incomes. 
Assuming that the amounts of private consumption health purchased are zero or 
randomly distributed, with optimal ranking, the new entrants are patients with a 
lower IXz ∂∂ / , i.e. with conditions medically minor or less susceptible to care 
than those treated before. The empirical finding to this effect is thus also 
consistent with optimality and does not necessarily imply demand-shifting, which 
appears to be the dominating interpretation.12 
 
As proposed earlier, 
 
                     
_
      τ      _ 
 Yi = ziYi =  Σ  zityit ,                 (16) 
  
18 
                            t=0 
 
           
 where ( ) rtitit eyEy −≡ , 
 
and zit is the expected value of zi in period t, E(yit) that of patient i' s expected 
marginal product in his normal state of health in period t, τ  his remaining time in 
the labor force, and r the marginal social rate of time preference. The interested 
reader can verify by obvious steps that, given the timing of the care 
-  the greater the marginal social rate of time preference, and 
- the more remote the patient' s expected high income years, the less it is optimal 
to spend on the patient' s care.13 
 
3. Conclusions and Extensions 
 
We have derived criteria for medical care decisions beyond the public health 
standard, consistent with an efficient allocation of resources in a model where 
health is a special case of a good produced, consumed, and used as an input in 
production, and for the tax and subsidy statuses that the social planner has to 
stipulate for different kinds of care so as to induce patients to choose the socially 
optimal therapies. 
 
It was shown to be optimal to provide health care beyond the conventional 
optimum point where the marginal product generated by the care equals its 
marginal social cost, to the point where the sum of the marginal product and the 
marginal utility equals that cost, but only if the patient is willing to pay the full 
marginal social cost of the part of the extra that exceeds the marginal product, 
out of his after-tax income. It is optimal to make the cost of all investment care 
deductible from taxable income. However, if the patient has fully paid sick leave, 
investment care should be free for the patient to choose the optimal amount of 
care. Thus the optimum price of investment health and sick pay are connected 
via the patient’s optimization. 
 
The higher the patient' s labor income, and the greater the expected marginal 
therapeutic gain from care, the more it is optimal to spend on more efficient 
(and/or safer) therapy. Therefore it is indeed optimal to give a greater “tax 
subsidy” to high labor income earners by making investment health expenses, 
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but not private consumption health expenses, deductible from taxable income. 
The greater the marginal social rate of time preference, or the more remote the 
patient' s entry in the labor force, the less it is optimal to spend on the patient' s 
care. Care to hopeless cases, beyond the public health standard, is not justified 
by investment criteria, which makes it private consumption. 
 
If the user cost of care is kept below its marginal social cost, rationing is 
necessary to induce patients to choose the optimal amount of care. In rationing, 
it is optimal to rank the patients according to their marginal products from care, 
and give each patient treatment down to the point where the marginal product 
equals the marginal social cost of care. Requests for additional therapy should 
be treated as private consumption on the part that exceeds the marginal product 
of the additional therapy. Likewise, it is optimal to admit a patient who was 
rationed on the above criterion if he is willing to pay enough to get above the line. 
 
Increase in hospital capacity leads to treating patients with cases minor to those 
treated before, incomes equal, if rationing is done optimally, and is not 
necessarily a sign of demand-shifting. 
 
It is optimal to use these criteria for care decisions irrespective of the other 
objectives of health care policy, since they bring society to its production 
possibility frontier, maximizing its consumption possibilities. Let us return to our 
example from Britain, where the National Health Service restricts access to 
dialysis of patients over 55 years of age (see Weisbrod (1991)). Let the care up 
to this age be the public health good. Our approach would suggest administering 
care thereafter up to the point where the marginal product of the care equals the 
marginal social cost, the user cost, if any, being deductible from taxable income. 
It is optimal to provide more if the patient is willing to pay for the private 
consumption part of the extra care out of his after-tax income, and the 
investment part out of his taxable income. On retirement, rather than at 55, the 
entire cost would thus become non-deductible. 
 
It is optimal for the employer to pay the more of the worker’s health care bill, the 
lower the user cost of health, the more efficient care is in shortening the sick 
leave, the greater the substitute’s wage cost and the patient’s unit sick pay costs, 
and the smaller the patient’s wage cost to the employer, all including payroll 
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taxes. Depending on these factors the employer may be disinterested in 
spending anything on the patient’s care, or bring the patient’s health past the 
social optimum. 
 
The above propositions have several implications. Take, for instance, the 
observed correlation between the number of operations and the number of 
surgeons, both per capita, which has been interpreted as evidence in support of 
demand shifting. (See e.g. Fuchs, (1978), p. 46, whereas Pauly, (1980), p. 107, 
fails to get a significant parameter). The above decision criteria suggest first that 
since health is a normal good, the consumption demand for health care is 
positively correlated with (total household) income (Equations 1 and 2). Second, 
it is optimal to give more expensive therapy to patients with high labor incomes if 
it brings them more quickly (and more safely) to working condition (Proposition 
1): surgery is often quicker and would dominate in marginal cases, were it not for 
cost considerations. Third, it is rational for surgeons - and economists - to locate 
in areas where the demand for their services is high - i.e. high income areas. 
And fourth, since the ∂X/∂H of physicians are a function of their training and 
experience, it is optimal for a surgeon to exercise his comparative advantage by 
using surgery in marginal cases where others would not have used it. Therefore 
the correlation between surgery rates and the supply of surgeons also finds an 
explanation in their causal link with patient income.14 Since most would agree 
that this mechanism is there, any test for SID needs to control for it. The 
qualitative results stand in both cases also if doctors use the user cost, rather 
than the marginal social cost as the shadow price in the care decision, as long as 
the two costs are positively related.15 
 
We believe that it is important to examine health care issues in a broader context 
of general resource allocation, explicitly allowing for the three aspects of health. 
It has applications for a number of problems in health care policy. We also 
believe that as society’s ability to offer ever more costly new therapies as a free 
service becomes more and more limited, decision-makers would benefit from the 
present approach when making the hard choices of the future. 
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Appendix 
 
Could the patient' s employer have an incentive to pay part of the bill to induce 
the patient to choose more effective and more costly care and return to work 
sooner? The employer maximizes profits, as in Eqs. (5) and (7), which implies 
minimization of the cost of the sick leave (W). Let us assume for simplicity that 
the employer does not find it optimal to adjust output because of a worker' s sick 
leave e.g. because of adjustment costs. Each period the cost (W) consists of the 
substitute' s (or alternative arrangement’s) productivity-adjusted wages (b) plus 
the patient' s sick pay (s), minus the wages that would have been paid to the 
patient (w) had he been at work producing the output now produced by the 
substitute. The W is the sum of the present values of the period costs for the 
length of the sick leave (T), plus the amount ( )cXIE PX  that the employer pays for 
more intensive care to shorten the length of the sick leave: 
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where IEX  is the amount of health purchased by the employer and r the interest 
rate. In Eq. (18), the length of the sick leave is a declining function of IEX . 
Diminishing returns make 22 / IEXT ∂∂  positive. 
 
Proposition 6. It is optimal for the employer to purchase the more health care to 
get the patient back to work sooner, the more effective the care and the lower its 
user cost, the greater the substitute’s cost and the patient’s unit sick pay cost, 
the smaller the patient’s unit wage cost and the interest rate, and the shorter the 
sick leave before the employer’s intervention.  Minimizing Eq. (17) with respect to 
IEX , subject to Eq. (18) yields: 
 
 ( )( ) rTIEcX ewsbXTP −−+∂∂−= /               (19)  
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The second-order condition for minimum is satisfied by the assumption of 
diminishing returns on IEX  with respect to T. Thus it is optimal for the employer 
to purchase more health care to get the patient back to work, the lower PXc, the 
more effective care is in shortening the sick leave, and the greater the 
substitute' s wage cost and the patient' s unit sick pay costs and the smaller the 
patient' s unit wage cost, all including payroll taxes, and the smaller the interest 
rate, and the shorter the sick leave before the employer’s intervention. 
 
In our model with a homogeneous labor force the cost and productivity of the 
substitute are equal to those of the patient in his normal state of health, i.e. b = 
w. If the patient gets no sick pay, s = 0. The right-hand side of Eq. (19) is thus 
zero, and the employer hires a substitute from the market for the duration of the 
patient' s sick leave at the same cost as the patient' s wage cost. Thus the 
employer has no incentive to pay anything to accelerate the patient' s recovery.  
 
Secondly, if the patient has a sick leave with full pay, s = w, and Eq.(19) reads 
( ) rTIEcX ebXTP −∂∂−= // , which is equal to ( )YXz I∂∂ /  in the absence of payroll 
taxes, with z defined with respect to time: quicker recovery saves the employer 
the substitute’s wage cost. Thus it is optimal for the employer to pay an amount 
making the value of the marginal product of health equal to the marginal user 
cost of the health. If PXc = PX, this would bring the patient to point 1IX  in the 
Figure in the absence of payroll taxes, and beyond with them. If PXc < PX, it is 
optimal for the employer to pay for more care. In our model, sick pay and the 
employer’s payroll taxes are the reasons why it can be optimal for the employer 
to pay part of the cost to induce the patient to buy more health. 
 
Next combine the employer’s incentives with those of the employee, assuming 
that health is priced and taxed optimally. We obtain from Eqs. (13) and (19): 
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The left-hand side of Eq. (20) equals ( )YXz I∂∂ /  if e.g. (b = s = w) and there are 
no payroll taxes, as shown above. With full sick pay, the patient does not have 
an incentive to pay for investment health. Since health care is priced optimally, 
PXc = 0 for investment health. Returning to the numerical example, the first 
patient gets the $18 900 care for free, and would get the $35 000 care for a non-
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deductible $6 500. If the patient initially chose the first care, the employer would 
have to pay up to this amount to induce the patient to choose the third therapy, 
as the patient is presumably willing to pay something to be well for an extra 
month ( )0/ >∂∂ IXU . Since the present value of the patient’s income (and sick 
pay) for the fourth month is $9 600, it would be optimal for the employer to pay 
the $6 500 even in the absence of payroll taxes to get the worker back to work 
sooner. It is of interest to note that in this situation the employer pays for private 
consumption health in order to get the benefits from investment health. 
 
Next examine the second patient’s situation (income $5 000 per month). The 
present value of the marginal product of the four-month care over no care is $9 
450. With full sick pay this is optimally free of charge so that it is optimal to 
provide the $18 900 therapy for a non-deductible $9 450. The employer would 
be indifferent between paying this amount to get the patient to work in four 
months on the one hand, and hiring a substitute, on the other, in the absence of 
payroll taxes, since the employer would be saving an equal amount in sick pay. If 
there are payroll taxes, it would be optimal for it to choose the former alternative. 
 
The marginal cost of the $35 000 care over the first care is $16 100(= $35 000 - 
$18 900), while the present value of the fourth month’s income is $4 800, leaving 
the non-deductible net marginal cost of $11 300. If the patient is willing to pay 
nothing for the more effective care, the employer would have to pay this amount 
extra to get the worker back to work after three months. The payroll taxes would 
have to be over 135 per cent of the extra wages of $4 800 to make the employer 
interested in paying for this extra care. Obviously, the game-theoretic issues 
opened by this situation are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The above examples were cases of the employer paying conditional on the 
patient choosing a particular therapy. However, considerations of equity between 
employees may cause the employer to opt for a standard rule, which may make 
the optimal value of T a function of the terms of the employer’s offer if it affects 
the patient’s marginal conditions. An unconditional lumpsum contribution fails to 
affect the marginal conditions, which makes dT zero: the patient chooses the 
same amount of health as originally and keeps the contribution. An offer to pay a 
given percentage of the bill is equivalent to a subsidy in Eqs. (13) and (20), which 
lowers the patient’s PXc. Applying the Figure to the patient’s situation, the price 
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curve shifts down by the amount of the subsidy, which increases the quantity of 
health purchased by the patient. The employer could also offer to pay part of the 
extra health in excess of a given level, where the value of investment health is 
calculated as in the numerical example, or make an all-or-nothing offer 
conditional on the patient choosing a given therapy. Of course, the terms of sick 
pay are generally determined by a standard rule. 
 
There are numerous combinations of partial sick pay, partial tax deductibility of 
the patient’s investment health expenses and payroll taxes that can make the 
employer interested in paying part of the bill. However, these examples suffice to 
show how the employer’s incentives are determined and how they can affect the 
patient. 
 
In reality, substitute labor is often less productive than encumbent workers, 
which increases b and makes greater spending on the patient' s health optimal. 
Substitutes may also need training. The training costs are normally a sunk cost, 
which do not affect the marginal conditions. They may, however, affect the global 
optimum by making overtime work by the encumbent labor force the dominating 
alternative - the more so the shorter the sick leave. In that case the unit cost (b) 
is overtime pay. It may thus be optimal for the employer to bring the patient past 
the social optimum 2IX . On the other hand, it is also possible that b < w, as 
when the patient is an old unproductive senior worker in a simple job. If, besides, 
s = 0, the employer can actually make money on the worker' s sick leave and has 
no incentive to accelerate his recovery. 
 
In summary, in our model with a homogenous labor force, sick pay, payroll taxes, 
and substitutes’ higher costs can provide the patient’s employer with an incentive 
to pay part of the bill, which may lead to the patient getting more care than the 
social optimum. 
 
Would the government have an interest in sharing in the patient' s hospital bill? If 
society' s objective is maximization of societal welfare as postulated in Eq.(1), it 
would be optimal for society to make sure, one way or another, that the patient 
gets 2IX  in the ways discussed above. In reality, an impediment to this may be 
that some patients are liquidity-constrained. Then the availability of financing for 
medical costs is an essential condition for the optimum of these patients, as 
  
25 
argued by Feldstein (1981). The possibility of making 2IP XX =  and the 
implications it has for the optimal pricing and tax status of care has been 
discussed above. It is becoming increasingly costly in addition to being politically 
questionable on equity grounds. Of course, discussion of the implications of 
other policy objectives is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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1. Accordingly, in Britain, the National Health Service restricts access to dialysis 
of patients over 55 years of age (see Weisbrod (1991)). In the United States, 
discussion on the Patient’s Bill of Rights continues, a quarter of the population 
being without health insurance protection. Yet the systematization effort of the 
Oregon plan has widely had a hostile reception. 
 
2. Optimality requires that the public health system should reimburse a patient 
receiving care belonging to the public health standard from a private provider by 
its cost at a public hospital. 
 
3. Of course, the consumption of a household being a function of total household 
income, also the demand for consumption care of its individual members is a 
function of that income. 
 
4. Of course, only values above the minimum level where the patient is fit for the 
labor force count in the calculation. Thus the z function intercepts the X axis at 
this minimum. 
 
5. Naturally, the marginal social product and marginal social utility include in 
principle any externalities that IiX  may have, positive externalities increasing the 
values of x and U above their private counterparts. As is well known, they 
constitute a case for subsidizing IX  by the value of the externality per unit of 
IX , leading to the same optimum as with the private variables. We have 
refrained from complicating the model at this point and let externalities be 
explicitly taken care of by PX . There is of course a one-to-one mapping between 
the social and private marginal product and marginal utility of IX . 
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6.  For a discussion on whether it is meaningful to even have a demand curve for 
health care, see e.g. Feldman et al. (1993) and Dranove (1995). 
 
7.  Eq. (13) implies 
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8. The system that is being introduced in Finland is consistent with the above 
principles regarding the status of private consumption health, but not the criteria 
for investment health. In terms of our terminology, the public health good is 
determined by clinical criteria and is provided by health clinics and public 
hospitals. The patient is given a voucher for referral care not provided by the 
clinic. It entitles to essentially free care at a public hospital, where queuing is part 
of the package for non-acute cases. Alternatively, it is good for (often partial) 
payment at a private hospital at the price that the public hospital charges the 
health clinic. The non-deductible extra at a private hospital is thus regarded as 
private consumption health, involving such consumption goods as prompt and 
individual attention, choice of the physician, and a cognac after surgery, but also 
the option of therapy more costly than that prescribed. 
 
A corresponding practice could be extended to prescription drugs: The 
prescription could specify a generic product qualifying for health insurance 
benefits. If the patient wants a branded product, he could be responsible for the 
difference in price on a non-deductible basis. The national health insurance 
system also provides full catastrophic insurance for annual drug and hospital 
costs in excess of $500. 
 
9. One may have to base these calculations on averages in the experimental 
population. However, physicians already give patients cost and duration 
forecasts of alternative therapies. The moral hazard problems of doctors can be 
alleviated by monitoring physician assessments of the lengths of care against 
their realizations. Analogous standards are already used in hospital and even 
physician performance measurement. 
 
  
28 
10. An implication is that it is optimal to have different kinds of health insurance, 
and the premia of first class coverage should be deductible for high labor income 
earners on the part regarded as investment health. This is problematic from 
several points of view, which may be a reason why many companies have 
purchased health insurance for their top managements. 
 
11. It follows that in cases where HX I ∂∂ / is practically zero, as in advanced 
cases of terminal cancer, AIDS, or "obviously" fatal injuries, care is not justified 
by investment criteria, which makes even the alleviation of pain  consumption. If 
it is called for by legislation, court verdicts, or other societal norms, a case could 
be made for regarding it as free publicly provided consumption, when it would be 
financed mainly from public sources. The rest is private consumption. This has 
important implications for when "the plug should be pulled", who is to decide on it 
at different stages, and who should pay. This is a corollary of the above optimum 
condition. Of course, care to retirees is likewise consumption. 
 
12. Physician surveys in the United States have suggested that there has 
seldom been rationing of hospital care to patients. However, the hospitals that 
have added capacity are likely to be in this minority: investments are made in 
response to demand so that hospitals expand only if they have actual or 
expected capacity shortages. It is also rational to tighten criteria for hospital care 
and use substitutes when there is a shortage of capacity (i.e. prior to expansion), 
and relax them when the shortage is over (i.e. after expansion). 
 
13. It is seen that preventive care is a special case of investment (and 
consumption) care, to which the present analysis applies. It increases the 
expected present value of the worker' s productivity in the future by affecting his 
probability of getting sick, given his exposure to agents causing illness. 
 
14. To get around the identification problem, Fuchs explains surgeon supply with 
per capita hotel receipts of the area and finds that physicians tend to settle in 
attractive areas. He then explains demand with the predicted surgeon supply and 
per capita income. However, attractive areas are generally also high income 
areas. Thus both surgeon supply and the demand for surgery are highly 
correlated with income, apparently rendering the demand-shifting correlation 
spurious. This is also supported by another symptom to that effect: income 
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becomes significant only when surgeon supply is omitted as an explanatory 
variable. 
 
15. What would constitute evidence of demand-shifting? If the physician uses 
more costly care that is widely recognized as being clinically weakly dominated 
by less costly (or no) care (i.e. care having no higher ( ) ( )tt rzE +Σ∆ 1/ ) for equal 
risk for any specialty of doctors, given the set of symptoms, he is either 
incompetent or shifting demand (c.f. Pauly (1994)). Of course, even here the 
evaluation must be based on the information available at the time of the care 
decision and not on the information that care produces, as has often been done 
(c.f. Reinhardt (1983, 1985)). This makes demand shifting very hard to prove. It 
becomes even harder when risk is taken into account: as long as the degree of 
societal risk aversion is not explicitly stipulated, almost any care that reduces risk 
can be justified. 
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